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Abstract 
Whilst thought control strategies are becoming increasingly recognised as 
counterproductive, the role of psychological flexibility has been observed in 
depression, anxiety and chronic pain, however little research has considered its role 
in insomnia. It was hypothesised that psychological flexibility would predict levels of 
insomnia. Participants were 162 male and female adults seeking chronic pain 
treatment who completed a set of questionnaires measuring four variables of 
psychological flexibility and insomnia severity. Results indicated that measures of 
psychological flexibility were significant correlated with measures of sleep quality. 
Multiple regression analysis revealed that collectively, chronicity of pain, usual pain 
intensity and measures of psychological flexibility accounted for 30.2% of the 
variance in insomnia severity scores. Further studies are needed to verify these 
results in order to effectively treat the problem of insomnia occurring secondary to 
chronic pain.  
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Ethics Statement 
This study was complied in accordance of both the University of Plymouth ethical 
guidelines and the local and national ethics committees (Bath Research Ethics 
Committee and National Research Ethics Service). Data was collected using a pre-
designed set of questionnaires given to patients attending an assessment at the Bath 
Centre for Pain Services.  
The patients were sent a questionnaire pack to complete prior to their assessment. 
On Arrival participants returned the completed questionnaires to their assessing 
psychologist and signed a consent form if they agree for their data to be used. 
Participants were informed that their data may be used for both research purposes 
and treatment purposes and only be members of staff. Contact details were provided 
for those who wished to find out more about the use of their data or withdraw their 
data.  
Participants were not exposed to any risk of harm greater than that in ordinary life. As 
completing the questionnaires involved personal and private information, participants 
were protected from stress through the reassurance that they were under no 
constraint to answer the questions.  
All data collected will remain confidential and anonymous and participants will only 
be recognised by an identification number. A separate document containing 
participant‟s identification numbers with their corresponding name and date of birth 
will only be available to the experimenter and project supervisors.  
 
Introduction 
The occurrence of chronic pain is alarmingly common and the detrimental impact on 
the quality of life of those who are suffering well known (Breivik et al. 2006). As well 
as being the most common psychological complaint in the general population, 
insomnia also appears to be highly prevalent in those with chronic pain, with studies 
reporting between 50-88% of chronic pain patients complaining of significant 
difficulties sleeping (Smith & Haythornthwaite, 2004). Insomnia has been shown to 
cause significant distress to the sufferer in addition to social, interpersonal and 
occupational impairment. The most replicated finding in studies of insomniacs is that 
they report unpleasant intrusive thoughts and excessive worry during the pre-sleep 
period (Harvey, Tang, & Browning, 2005; Lichstein & Rosenhal, 1980; Morin, 1993). 
Cognitive models of insomnia assume that the development and maintenance of 
insomnia is a result of these unwanted thoughts and beliefs (Harvey, Tang & 
Browning, 2005). The natural response is the attempt to avoid or suppress these 
undesired cognitions, however, the counterproductive effects of this are becoming 
increasingly recognised. The term psychological flexibility is derived from Acceptance 
and Commitment Therapy (ACT) and refers to “the ability to be fully conscious and 
open to our experiences so we can act on our values (Harris, 2009, p.8). ACT 
attempts to encourage willingness to experience negative psychological events such 
as thoughts, beliefs or sensations, and has thus far demonstrated efficacy in relieving 
symptoms of anxiety, depression and chronic pain (Eifert et al. 2009; Forman et al. 
2007; Vowles & McCracken, 2008). The underlying assumption of this therapy is that 
efforts to control and suppress unwanted thoughts and feelings is counterproductive 
and essentially exacerbates struggle and distress. Considering the co-morbidity of 
insomnia and chronic pain, it may be reasonable to assume that encouraging 
psychological flexibility, rather than psychological inflexibility, may be a promising 
method of relieving the disabling effects of these conditions.  
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Cognitive Models of Insomnia 
Previous studies have suggested that the development and maintenance of insomnia 
encompasses a wide range of cognitive processes including beliefs, reasoning, 
memory, attributions, expectations, perception and attention.  The role of cognitive 
processes in insomnia was first highlighted by Storms and Nisbett in 1970, who 
suggested that patients suffering from insomnia feel anxious and aroused prior to 
sleeping as they worry and ruminate about not being able to sleep (Storms & Nisbett, 
1970, cited by Harvey, Tang & Browning, 2005). Testing their hypothesis, Storms 
and Nisbett administered a placebo tablet to insomnia patients, informing one half 
that the tablet would cause arousal and the other half that it would have a relaxing 
effect. Sleep onset latency was faster in those who were told the tablet would be 
arousing, which was explained to be as a result of this group attributing their arousal 
to the anticipated effects of the tablet; this, in turn, reduced their own anxiety 
therefore allowing faster sleep onset. The 1970‟s also saw a surge in research 
focusing on the role of perception in insomnia, suggesting that distorted perception of 
sleep is one of the main cognitive process pertaining to insomnia; a phenomena 
which is still being studied today (Bixler et al. 1973 cited by Harvey et al. 2005; 
Fichten et al. 2001; Tang and Harvey, 2004). 
  
Research by Lichstein and Rosenthal (1980) found that in a sample of 296 
insomniacs, cognitive arousal was ten times more likely to be stated as the major 
cause of insomnia in comparison to somatic arousal (Lichstein & Rosenthal, 1980, 
cited by Harvey et al. 2005). Findings by Sanavio (1988) and Van Egeren et al. 
(1983) highlighted a correlation between the content of pre-sleep thoughts rather 
than frequency of pre-sleep thoughts in insomniacs. As a result, the role of pre-sleep 
cognitions became an important interest for researchers. These findings were 
supported by Charles Morin using his measure of dysfunctional beliefs (Morin et al. 
1993). In comparison to self-defined good sleepers, chronic insomniacs were more 
likely to endorse beliefs about the negative consequences of insomnia, express more 
hopelessness about losing control of their sleep and more helplessness about its 
unpredictability. Similar results were found when investigating catastrophic worry in 
patients with insomnia, who rated their chances of poor sleep higher and generated 
more catastrophes about not sleeping than good sleepers (Harvey & Greenall, 2003). 
This is in concordance with findings that a reduction in dysfunctional beliefs regarding 
sleep, as result of cognitive behavioural therapy for insomnia, was associated with 
positive post-treatment outcome (Edinger et al. 2001). 
 
Recent cognitive models of insomnia have also recognised the presence of „safety 
behaviours‟ in insomniacs (Bélanger et al. 2005; Harvey, 2002; Harvey & Greenall, 
2003; Ree et al. 2005). Thought control as a safety behaviour is suggested to be a 
common feature in a range of psychological disorders, however, there has been 
much discussion as to whether the attempt to suppress thoughts is helpful or not and 
whether it is even possible to control what we think and feel (Bakker, 2009).  The 
Thought Control Questionnaire Insomnia-Revised (TCQI-R; Ree et al. 2005) 
identified six factors involved in thought control; aggressive suppression, cognitive 
distraction, reappraisal, social avoidance, behavioural distraction and worry. 
Cognitive distraction (such as trying to think pleasant thoughts instead) appears to 
predict better sleep quality where as behavioural distraction (such as doing 
something enjoyable) predicts worse sleep quality (Ree et al. 2005). Furthermore, a 
higher frequency of aggressive suppression, behavioural distraction, social 
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avoidance and worry correlated with higher reports of anxiety and depression and, 
hence, poorer sleep quality. More recently, theorists and researchers of Acceptance 
and Commitment Therapy and Mindfulness have suggested that not only is thought 
suppression ineffective but it is also counterproductive. For example, the “white bear” 
studies of Wegner (1989, cited by Harvey et al. 2005) suggested that conscious 
attempts to suppress a thought are likely to result in paradoxical increases in 
frequency of the targeted thought. It is now widely acknowledged that suppressing 
unwanted thoughts often leads to a subsequent increase in the frequency of such 
thoughts and in turn results in higher levels of distress (Harvey, 2002; Hayes et al. 
1999; Marcks & Woods, 2005). Highlighting its problematic consequences, Najmi, 
Riemann and Wegner (2009) boldly concluded that the attempt to control unwanted 
thoughts is “at best unsustainable and at worst counterproductive” (p.494). 
 
Psychological Flexibility  
Psychological flexibility refers to the ability to “be in the present moment with full 
awareness and openness to our experience, and to take action guided by our values” 
(Harris, 2009, p.12).  This is in contrast to directing efforts towards the suppression of 
unwanted thoughts, avoidance of unpleasant feelings and sensations and distraction 
away from current experience as these behaviours interfere with long term values 
and goal pursuit. Psychological flexibility collectively describes the underlying 
processes of Acceptance and Commitment therapy (ACT). ACT is based on 
Relational Frame Therapy (RFT) which recognises that the central component of 
human language and cognition is our ability to learn and relate events (Hayes et al. 
2001, cited by Hayes et al. 2006). Consistent with the “white bear” studies of Wegner 
et al. (1987), the RFT assumes that elaborated relational networks rarely disappear 
and are often only further elaborated (Wilson & Hayes, 1996). This relates to one of 
the main underlying assumptions of ACT; control is the problem, and not the solution. 
For example, telling yourself not to think about chocolate cake usually fails as the 
instruction itself contains the item that is being avoided.  
 
There are six core pathological processes thought to contribute to an individual‟s 
struggle and for each there is a corresponding ACT based therapeutic process 
(Harris, 2009). 
  
Cognitive fusion: 
Cognitive fusion refers to the control an individual‟s thoughts can have over their 
behaviour as they are „fused‟ with their thoughts, feelings and beliefs. The 
therapeutic process for this is defusion which through the use of mindfulness 
meditation encourages the individual to separate or detach themselves from their 
thoughts and feelings and view them as just words.  
 
Attachment to the conceptualized self: 
This occurs when an individual becomes fused with their own self description which 
is often made up of negative thoughts and beliefs. The therapeutic process of self-as-
context encourages recognition of the thinking self and the observing self as 
separate. 
 
Unworkable action: 
This describes the patterns of behaviour which pull an individual away from a valued 
way of living, for example drug taking or social withdrawal. This is tackled 
therapeutically with committed action which encourages the individual to take 
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effective action, guided by their values and goals, with the aim of enjoying a rich and 
meaningful life. 
  
Lack of contact with personal values: 
Learning to clarify what is truly important is an essential step towards leading a 
valued life.   
 
Dominance of the conceptualized past and future: 
This refers to an individual‟s loss of contact with the present moment as they dwell on 
the past or ruminate about the future. Contact with the present moment encourages 
the individual to consciously pay attention to the here-and-now experience instead of 
operating on „auto-pilot‟.  
 
Experiential avoidance: 
Emotional avoidance describes an individuals attempt to avoid, erase or suppress 
unwanted private experiences and is addressed therapeutically by encouraging 
acceptance of unpleasant and distressing thoughts, feelings, emotions, urges and 
sensations. Relinquishing the natural desire to struggle with these experiences and 
recognising them for what they are should in turn reduce their overwhelming effect on 
the individual.  In summary, ACT serves to balance the acceptance and mindfulness 
processes with commitment and behavioural change processes.  
 
Psychological flexibility and Insomnia 
Acceptance and Commitment therapy has demonstrated efficacy in dealing with a 
variety of psychological conditions including anxiety, depression, and obsessive-
compulsive disorder. (Eifert et al. 2009; Forman et al. 2007; Twohig, Hayes & 
Masuda, 2006).  Lundh and Broman‟s (2000) cognitive model of insomnia proposes 
two key processes that are involved in the development and maintenance of 
insomnia; sleep-interfering processes and sleep-interpreting processes. Sleep-
interfering processes include arousal-producing processes (either cognitive or 
physiological) and sleep-interpreting processes include misperceptions of sleep 
including dysfunctional beliefs, expectations and attributions. In contrast, Lundh 
argues that healthy presleep processes require cognitive deactivation, which involves 
a decrease in an individual‟s controlled information processing in parallel with 
physiological deactivation (Lundh, 2005). This process of cognitive activation is 
assumed to involve less verbal regulation and control than during daytime 
functioning, and more acceptance of spontaneously occurring mental and 
physiological processes (Espie, 2002). It is suggested that whilst most people 
engage in controlled processing (such a problem solving) during wake time, 
functional sleep processes should encourage de-arousal and failure to disengage will 
inhibit sleep-promoting processes. Considering mindfulness meditation encourages 
cognitive, behavioural and emotional, Espie (2002) proposed that it may be sufficient 
in training the ability to deactivate controlled information processing by learning to 
observe spontaneously occurring physical and psychological processing in a non-
controlling or judgemental way. Few studies have examined the efficacy of 
mindfulness meditation in reducing problems and those that have are flawed. 
Mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR) employed to help sleeping problems in 
women with breast cancer found that those who reported greater mindfulness 
practice reported significant improvement in sleep quality (Shapiro et al. 2003). 
However, there were no significant differences between the MBSR group and control 
group and the treatment was not specifically designed for insomnia. Significant 
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improvements in sleep variables in a study using mindfulness therapy specifically 
adapted for insomnia, however there was no control group to compare efficiency 
(Heidenreich, 2003, cited by Lundh, 2005). A pilot study using ACT-inspired 
treatment for insomnia yielded promising results (Akerlund, Bolanowski & Lundh, 
2004, cited by Lundh, 2005).  
 
Psychological flexibility and Chronic Pain 
Many forms of treatment for chronic pain focus on decreasing pain in the sufferer, 
which may be beneficial when eliminating pain is achievable and leads to better 
functioning in the long term. However, these types of treatment become problematic 
when attempts to alleviate pain do not succeed and instead the sufferer moves 
further and further away from doing the things that are important to them.  
 In contrast, ACT serves to decrease the distressing and disabling influences of pain 
rather than decreasing pain itself. Similar to the studies recognising the 
ineffectiveness of thought suppression, research has shown that attempts to control 
pain leads to less pain tolerance when compared to not attempting to control pain 
(Gutiérrez et al. 2004, Hayes et al. 1999b). Furthermore, studies have demonstrated 
that excessive avoidance of chronic pain can lead to greater suffering and disability 
(Asmundson et al. 1999, Bortz, 1984). A study of coping responses in individuals with 
chronic pain identified that those who reported higher levels of struggling to control 
pain also reported higher levels of pain, distress and disability (McCracken, 
Eccleston & Bell, 2005).  
 
Recent research into the use of ACT in the management of chronic pain has revolved 
around two main therapeutic focuses; engagement in daily activity regardless of pain 
and willingness to have pain present without responding to it.  A preliminary analysis 
of treatment outcomes for patients receiving an acceptance-based approach to 
chronic pain found significant improvements in emotional, social and physical 
functioning (McCracken, Vowles & Eccleston, 2005). These improvements remained 
consistent at the three month follow–up and improvements in most outcomes 
correlated with an increase in acceptance. Similar results were achieved in a study 
by Vowles and McCracken (2008), where there was a significant reduction in pain, 
depression, pain-related anxiety, disability and physical performance. Improvements 
were also found in terms of acceptance of pain and values-based action, which were 
associated with improvements in the other domains.  
 
Both insomnia and chronic pain are known to have detrimental affects on various 
aspects of an individual‟s quality of life, including physical, social and emotional 
wellbeing and given the suggestion of a reciprocal relationship between sleep and 
pain this is a problem that needs to be addressed (Smith and Haythornthwaite, 
2004). Problems sleeping, as experienced by chronic pain sufferers, include; later 
sleep onset, shorter sleep time, poor sleep quality, poor sleep efficiency and more 
frequent and longer awakenings after sleep onset (Tang, 2008). As such, having 
trouble sleeping appears to be a major source of distress for people living with 
chronic pain. For example, a study of patients seeking treatment for chronic pain 
reported that greater sleep disturbance was associated with, and predicted, greater 
pain, disability, physical symptoms of pain and depression (McCracken & Iverson, 
2002).  Additionally, sleep is often reported as a specific area in which chronic pain 
patients would like help (Casarett et al. 2001). What is even more striking is the 
prevalence of sleep disturbance (often similar to that of chronic insomnia) with 
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chronic pain, with some studies reporting occurrences as high as 88.9% (Breivik et 
al. 2006; McCracken & Iverson, 2002; Tang et al. 2007). 
 
The assumption that “untreated insomnia could serve to aggravate pain perception 
and contribute to poorer physical and psychosocial functioning” (Tang, 2008), and 
that this relationship is reciprocal is becoming well-recognised.  Research into the 
effects of total sleep deprivation and selective sleep interruption demonstrated a 
significant decrease in mechanical pain thresholds, highlighting the potential effects 
of sleep disturbances on pain responses (Hakkionen et al. 2001).  
 
Whilst pain can clearly influence sleep in terms of physical effects and body 
sensations (see Smith and Haythornthwaite, 2004 for a review), pain has also been 
shown to contribute to sleep disturbances in terms of cognitive-behavioural 
processes. For example, a study of pre-sleep cognitions in patients with insomnia 
secondary to chronic pain found that general pain-related thoughts were reported by 
36% whilst 26% reported thoughts about the experimental procedure (Smith et al. 
2000). In addition, negative sleep-related thoughts were also reported by 26%. 
Furthermore, in comparison to individuals who suffer pain but are good sleepers, 
those who are poor sleepers with pain report more pain, pain-related disability, 
depression, pain-related anxiety and more dysfunctional beliefs about sleep 
(Ashworth, Davidson & Espie, 2010). These findings suggest that the content of pre-
sleep cognitive arousal may be a contributing factor of sleep disturbance secondary 
to chronic pain.  
 
Despite the wealth of studies reporting treatment efficacy of Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy in various clinical problems, there is very little empirical 
evidence regarding psychological flexibility and Acceptance and Commitment 
Therapy with Insomnia. Therefore the purpose of this study is to examine whether 
psychological flexibility predicts the presence of insomnia. It is also assumed that 
higher levels of psychological inflexibility will be associated with higher levels of 
insomnia. 
 
Methods 
 
Participants  
Participants were 162 (60 male, 102 female) adult patients seeking treatment for 
chronic pain at the Bath Centre for Pain Services (BCPS), Somerset. All patients 
attend an assessment prior to treatment and are asked to complete a questionnaire 
pack. All collected data is entered in to a database, from which I selected all adult 
patients (from 18 years) from May 2008 to August 2009. Participants were mostly 
white (93%) and ranged in age from 19 to 76 years (M = 43.8, SD = 13.3).  
 
Participants presented a wide range of chronic pain conditions, but many were not 
able to provide an accurate diagnosis. The mean pain duration was 119 months (SD 
= 122, range = 9-720 months), with a mean usual pain intensity at 7.5 on a scale of 0 
to 10 (SD = 1.9, range = 2-10). The average number of hours sleep per night was 
5.25 (SD = 2.5, range 1-18). The majority of participants were married (52.2%), with 
28.9% single, 15.1% divorced and 3.8% widowed. The majority also reported not 
working due to their pain (48.7%).  
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Measures 
Each patient assessed provided information regarding their background 
characteristics such as age, gender and pain circumstances, They also provided an 
estimation of the duration of their pain and their usual pain intensity and current pain 
intensity on a scale of 0 (no pain) to 10 (worst pain possible). Their questionnaire 
pack included a series of measures of the primary psychological variables of interest 
in this study: mindfulness, psychological acceptance, chronic pain acceptance, and 
values-based action. All measures had been previously validated and tested for 
reliability.  
 
 The Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003) is a 15-
item measure designed to measure the opposite of mindfulness, 
„mindlessness‟, such as „‟I find myself doing things without paying attention‟. 
The items were averaged to form the total score and lower scores indicate 
higher levels of mindfulness.  
 
 The Acceptance Action Questionnaire-II (AAQ-II; Bond et al. 2008) contains 
10 items to assess the ability to accept undesirable thoughts and feelings and 
how they live a valued life with the difficult private experiences. The items are 
negatively phrased and rated on a scale from 1 (never true) to 7 (always true). 
The reversed items were added to give a total score. Higher scores represent 
higher levels of general acceptance where as lower scores represent lower 
levels of acceptance.  
 
 The Chronic Pain Acceptance Questionnaire (CPAQ; McCracken, Vowles & 
Eccleston, 2004) is a 20-item scale designed to assess levels of acceptance 
to pain. It consists of two sub-scales; activity engagement and pain willingness 
which measure the tendency to perform activities in the presence of pain and 
the absence of attempts to control pain. Each item is rated on a scale of 0 
(never true) to 6 (always true). The measure contains 9 negatively phrased 
items which were reversed and added to the remaining 11 items to form a total 
score.  
 
 The Chronic Pain Value Inventory (CPVI; McCracken & Yang, 2006) was used 
to measure six value domains; intimate relationships, family, friends, work, 
health, and growth and learning. The items were rated according to how 
successfully the participants believed they have lived according to each value 
on a scale from o (not at all successful) to 5 (extremely successful). The mean 
rating for each participant was taken as the total success score.  
 
 The Insomnia Severity Index (ISI; Bastien, Vallières & Morin, 2001) is a self-
report measure designed to measure perceived sleep difficulties. The 
measure contains seven items with different anchors. Participants were asked 
to rate each item on a scale of 0 to 4 and the scored were added to give a 
total score. Higher scores represent higher levels of insomnia.  
 The Sickness Impact Profile (SIP; Bergner, Bobbit & Carter, 1981) is a 136-
item measure of the impact of illness on various domains of daily functioning. 
For the purpose of this study, only measures from the 7-item Sleep and Rest 
subscale were used. Participants were asked to endorse statements that 
described the level of functioning in terms of day and night sleep and rest. The 
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higher the amount of endorsed statements represents the higher the amount 
of negative impact their pain has had on the sleep and rest.  
 
The questionnaire pack also included measures of sleep and rest, as well as 
participant‟s estimations of their average total sleep time and average time spent in 
bed.  
 
Procedure 
The ongoing collection of data from patients attending the BCPS has been approved 
by the Local Ethics Committee and written consent was obtained from all 
participants. Patients were sent their questionnaire packs to complete at home and 
returned upon assessment. All data was recorded and stored in a data base 
accessible only by staff at the centre. Each patient was given an identification 
number to be kept with the questionnaire data and their identity was kept in a 
separate database corresponding to their identification numbers.  
 
Results 
It was anticipated that psychological flexibility would predict the presence of insomnia 
in individuals with chronic pain. It was expected that that lower levels of psychological 
flexibility would predict higher levels of insomnia. 
  
Measures of acceptance, mindfulness and values-based action were significantly 
correlated with measures of insomnia (see Table 1). Specifically, measures of pain 
acceptance using the Chronic Pain Acceptance Questionnaire (CPAQ) were 
significantly correlated with measures from the Insomnia Severity Index (ISI), r = -
.328, p ≤ .001. Measures of general acceptance using the Acceptance Action 
questionnaire (AAQ) were also significantly correlated with insomnia scores, r = -
.276, p ≤ .01. Additionally, results from Mindful Attention-Awareness Scale (MAAS) 
were also significantly correlated with measures of insomnia, r = -.196, p ≤ .01. And 
finally, measures of values-based action from the Chronic Pain Value Inventory 
(CPVI) were significantly correlated with results from the ISI, r = -.275, p ≤ .001. 
Modest yet significant correlations were also found among measures of 
psychological flexibility and measures from the Sickness Impact Profile – Sleep and 
Rest (SIP-SR) and the estimates sleep efficiencies. A Bonferroni correction would 
lead to an adjusted alpha calculated as .05 ÷ 12 = .004. Only six out of 12 
coefficients in the correlation matrix met criteria at this more stringent level of 
significance, these are marked in Table 1 as significant at p < .004. Noticeably, after 
a Bonferroni correction is applied, measures of mindfulness were not significantly 
correlated with any of the sleep measures. All other measures of psychological 
flexibility were significantly correlated with the ISI and SIP-SR measures.  
 
Table 1: Correlations of acceptance, mindfulness and values-based action with measures of 
sleep. 
 
Measure CPAQ  MAAS  AAQ  CPVI 
 
ISI  -.328*** -.196*  -.276*** -.275*** 
SIP-SR -.282*** -.098  -.275*** -.325*** 
SE  .222*  .021  .103  .254** 
*** p < .004, two tails 
**  p < .01, two tails  
*   p < .05, two tails 
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Given that all measures of psychological flexibility predicted the presence of 
insomnia using the Insomnia Severity Index, a multiple aggression analysis was 
carried out in order to predict the extent to which each of the variables can predict 
levels of insomnia. The first predictor variable was chronicity of pain using the 
Stepwise method, and then usual pain intensity and total scores from the MAAS, 
CPVI, AAQ, and CPAQ were entered simultaneously using the Enter method. The 
dependent variable was the total score from the Insomnia Severity Index. The 
regression results are shown in Table 2. Chronicity of pain accounted for 4.9% of the 
variance in ISI scores (R² = .049), chronicity of pain and usual pain intensity 
accounted for 23.3% (R² = .233) and finally these variables with the measures of 
psychological flexibility accounted for 30.2% of the variance (R² = .349).  
 
All predictors together account for more variance than chronicity of pain alone (∆R² = 
.099) however usual pain intensity accounts for the most change in variance (∆R² = 
.201) suggesting that whilst there may be a relationship between psychological 
flexibility and insomnia severity, pain intensity may play a greater role. 
 
There is a positive relationship between measures of acceptance and insomnia 
severity (b = .002) suggesting that as general acceptance increases, insomnia 
severity will decrease. There is a negative relationship among measures of 
mindfulness, values-based action and pain acceptance and insomnia severity (b = -
.605, b = -1.011, b = -.040, respectively) so it may be likely that as these measures of 
psychological flexibility decrease, insomnia severity will increase. These findings 
support the hypothesis that lower levels of psychological acceptance can predict 
higher levels of insomnia.  
 
Table 2: Multiple regression analyses of acceptance, mindfulness, and values-based action 
with measures of sleep. 
 
Sleep Measure  Predictor  Beta   R²  ∆R² 
  
 
ISI   Model 1     .049  .049 
Chronicity of pain  -.009   
    
 
   Model 2     .250  .201 
   Chronicity of pain  -.009 
   Usual pain intensity  1.095 
 
 
   Model 3     .349  .099 
Chronicity of pain  -.009   
   Usual pain intensity  1.095 
   Acceptance of pain  -.040 
   Psychological Acceptance .002 
   Values-based action  -1.011 
   Mindfulness   -.605 
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Discussion 
The results of the study were consistent with previous research regarding 
psychological flexibility and the hypothesis that psychological flexibility predicts 
insomnia severity. A Pearson‟s correlation analysis found a significant relationship 
among all four measures of psychological flexibility (general psychological 
acceptance, mindfulness, values-based action and chronic pain acceptance) and 
levels of insomnia. Previous measures of psychological flexibility with chronic pain 
have demonstrated that greater psychological inflexibility (experiential avoidance and 
cognitive fusion) often correlate with greater struggle and suffering (McCracken & 
Velleman, 2010).  On the other hand, studies which have attempted to increase 
psychological flexibility using Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) have 
shown this leads to less struggle and distress (Vowles & McCracken, 2010).  
A closer look at the regression analyses show that whilst psychological flexibility is 
likely to be a predicting factor, pain also plays a major role in the onset and 
maintenance of insomnia. Putting aside the evidence demonstrating the impact of 
pain on sleep, this is a plausible argument that cannot be refuted, as we would 
clearly expect the distressing and unpleasant experience of pain sensations to affect 
sleep.  So whilst we cannot deny that pain significantly affects sleep, it be worthwhile 
attempting to help reduce suffering by directly addressing the problems of sleep 
using Acceptance and Commitment Therapy. Furthermore, the role of other 
contributing factors such as medication and daytime resting must not be overlooked. 
  
Comparing the proposed cognitive processes and behaviours underlying those 
suffering with insomnia alongside the psychological processes of ACT seems 
promising in terms of treatment. Cognitive models of insomnia suggest that the 
problem is often maintained by sleep-interfering arousal processes and dysfunctional 
sleep-interpreting processes that mutually reinforce each other (Harvey & Greenall, 
2003; Lundh & Broman, 2000; Morin et al. 1993). In response to these previous 
assumptions, increasing psychological flexibility through processes of ACT may be 
effective in promoting a more accepting approach to spontaneously occurring 
physical and psychological processes and in turn may help improve sleep efficiency. 
For example, consider the roles of experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion in the 
maintenance of insomnia. Experiential avoidance may refer to the individual‟s 
counterproductive attempts to eliminate or escape from unwanted pre-sleep thought, 
feelings and sensations.  Similarly, cognitive fusion may occur as individual‟s become 
„fused‟ with these undesired experiences. This may lead to thoughts such as “I must 
get at least 3 hours sleep” or “I must not think about the pain sensations in my left 
leg”. Encouraging the recognition that control strategies are not working and the 
acceptance of spontaneously occurring unwanted thoughts and sensations may help 
reduce struggle and distress. As recognised by Lundh (2005, p.35), “mindful 
observation of these processes may be assumed to lead to the perception that 
presleep processes and sleep fluctuates naturally as the result of various kinds of 
external and internal events”. Similar findings were found in a study by Ong, Shapiro, 
and Manber (2008) using thirty insomnia sufferers undergoing 6 weeks of treatment 
including mindfulness meditation and behavioural treatments for insomnia such as 
sleep restriction, sleep education, stimulus control and sleep hygiene. The combined 
treatments yielded significant pre-treatment to post-treatment results including a 
reduction in total wake time, somatic and cognitive pre-sleep arousal and negative 
sleep-related cognitions. Furthermore, the total number of mindful meditations was 
significantly correlated with scores from the Hyperarousal Scale (r = -.38, p , .05).  
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This initial study of psychological flexibility in relation to insomnia secondary to 
chronic pain has several limitations. Firstly, response rates differed greatly between 
different measures within the questionnaire as questions or sections were often 
missed. This can be explained by a number of factors. The whole questionnaire itself 
was 20 pages long, so respondents may have got bored of answering each question 
or may have simply accidentally missed questions. Alternatively, participants may 
have found the answers too difficult to answer or particularly challenging emotionally. 
The implications of this are that whilst one relationship may be represented by the 
majority of the sample, another may be represented less giving an inaccurate picture 
of the results.  
 
Secondly, the sleep measures used may be criticised in terms of their reliability and 
validity in indicating the presence of insomnia. Whilst the Insomnia Severity Index 
(ISI) has been recognised as a valid instrument to measure perceived insomnia 
severity (Bastien, Vallières & Morin, 2001) its focus is on the impact of insomnia 
rather than the characteristics of insomnia. Similarly, the „rest‟ section of the Sickness 
Impact Profile (SIP-SR) has a greater focus on daytime sleepiness and rest. 
Considering the assumed role of pre-sleep cognitive and somatic arousal in the 
development and maintenance of insomnia, these processes may give a better 
insight into individual‟s struggle with insomnia and its relation to their psychological 
flexibility or inflexibility. Measures such as the Pre-Sleep Arousal Scale (Nicassio et 
al. 1985), the Dysfunctional Beliefs and Attitudes About Sleep scale (Morin, 1993) 
and the Sleep Disturbance Questionnaire (Espie et al. 2000) may be used to assess 
beliefs, attitudes, expectations and attributions about sleep. The estimated sleep 
efficiency (SE) scores are based on very subjective opinions of sleeping and 
considering insomniacs are prone to distorted perceptions of sleep, particularly over-
estimating their lack of sleep (Harvey, Tang & Browning, 2005) this report should be 
interpreted with caution. Future studies of psychological flexibility and insomnia 
should attempt to use both objective and subjective measures of sleep to give a more 
accurate indication of problems sleeping. 
  
Whilst the large participant sample enables generalisation of the assumption that 
psychological flexibility is related to insomnia severity in chronic pain patients, a 
closer look at the components of the relationship might yield some interesting results.   
More qualitative analysis of individual cases would allow a closer look at the specific 
thoughts, feelings and body sensations underlying the individual‟s struggle with 
insomnia and chronic pain. This may encourage the development of more specific 
questionnaires measuring areas of psychological flexibility in this population so that 
the relationship may be better observed. More direct treatment for insomnia in 
chronic pain suffers using Acceptance and Commitment Therapy may also follow.   
Furthermore, it may be worthwhile investigating the role of other psychological 
disorders such as depression and anxiety and their role in the relationship.  
 
Despite interest in cognitive processes and arousal processes in insomnia, little has 
happened in terms of treatment. As Lundh (2005) observes; the best validated 
treatment for insomnia is still the stimulus control procedure which was introduced 
over thirty years ago (Bootzin, 1972). More recent treatments such as Sleep 
Restriction Therapy (Spielman, Caruso, Glovinsky, 1987) and Cognitive-Behavioural 
Therapy (Edinger et al. 2001; Lundh, 1998) have demonstrated efficacy but not 
above that of the stimulus control procedure.  Preliminary studies of Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy and Mindfulness Meditation techniques for insomnia have 
The Plymouth Student Scientist, 2010, 4, (1), 276-292 
 
[288] 
 
yielded promising results, however, they are often flawed in their methodology 
(Heidenrich, 2003, cited by Lundh, 2005; Shapiro et al. 2003).  Furthermore, these 
initial studies often involve ACT or mindfulness meditation combined with more 
traditional behavioural treatments for insomnia. Considering the only moderate 
contribution of psychological flexibility as suggested by the findings of this study, it 
may be reasonable to agree with Lundh‟s proposal that acceptance- and 
mindfulness-based techniques might be best utilised as part of a combination of 
methods which may increase the efficacy of insomnia treatment (Lundh, 2005). With 
such disabling effects and high prevalence, effective and long lasting treatment of 
insomnia secondary to chronic pain needs to be addressed. 
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